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The conscious field includes not only representations about external stimuli (e.g.,
percepts), but also conscious contents associated with internal states, such as
action-related intentions (e.g., urges). Although understudied, the latter may provide
unique insights into the nature of consciousness. To illuminate these phenomena, in a
new experimental paradigm [Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT)], participants were instructed
to not subvocalize the names of visually-presented objects. Each object was presented
for 10 s on a screen. Participants indicated whenever they involuntarily subvocalized the
object name. Research has revealed that it is difficult to suppress such subvocalizations,
which occur on over 80% of the trials. Can the effect survive if one intentionally
generates a competing (internally-generated) conscious content? If so, this would suggest
that intentional and unintentional contents can co-exist simultaneously in consciousness
in interesting ways. To investigate this possibility, in one condition, participants were
instructed to reiteratively subvocalize a speech sound (“da, da, da”) throughout the
trial. This internally generated content is self-generated and intentional. Involuntary
subvocalizations of object names still arose on over 80% of the trials. One could
hypothesize that subvocalizations occurred because of the pauses between the intended
speech sounds, but this is inconsistent with the observation that comparable results
arose even when participants subvocalized a continuous, unbroken hum (“daaa. . . .”)
throughout the trial. Regarding inter-content interactions, the continuous hum and object
name seem to co-exist simultaneously in consciousness. This intriguing datum requires
further investigation. We discuss the implications of this new paradigm for the study of
internally-generated conscious contents.
Keywords: consciousness, mental imagery, cognitive control, ironic processing, mind wandering, involuntary
processing
INTRODUCTION
It is a fact of common experience that the conscious field1
includes not only representations of external stimuli (e.g., per-
cepts), but also representations of internal states, such as action-
related intentions (e.g., urges, Merker, 2013). For example, at one
moment in time, one can be conscious of a table, a sign that reads
Coffee, a song playing in one’s head, a coffee mug, and also a
strong desire to have a sip of coffee. Most research in experimental
1The conscious field comprises of everything that one is conscious of at one
time.We are here referring to themost basic form of consciousness, such as the
experience of the color red or of an urge to breathe when holding one’s breath.
This form of consciousness has perhaps been best defined by the philosopher
Nagel (1974), who proposed that an organism possesses consciousness if there
is something it is like to be that organism—something it is like, for example, to
be human and experience pain, love, or breathlessness. Similarly, Block (1995)
claimed, “the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be
in that state” (p. 227).
psychology and neuroscience has focused on conscious contents
associated with perceptuo-semantic processes, especially those
that are triggered into existence by external stimuli (see reasons
for this in Rosenbaum, 2005; Morsella, 2009). In our example,
these kinds of content would be the perception of the table, the
mug, and the sign for Coffee. However, less investigation has been
devoted to illuminating contents associated with internal states
such as action-related intentions (the urge to have a sip of coffee)
and stimulus-independent mental imagery (a song in one’s head).
Although understudied, these phenomena may provide unique
insights into the nature of consciousness, insights that comple-
ment those obtained from more traditional, perception-based
research (see Discussion, Morsella and Poehlman, 2013).
To begin to fill this gap in the literature, in an experi-
mental project, we examined the conscious contents associ-
ated with action-related intentions (“action-related contents,” for
short) and with internally-generated, sustained mental imagery
(“sustained imagery,” for short). In addition, we obtained initial
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data regarding the nature of the interaction between these two
kinds of conscious contents (i.e., between action-related con-
tents and sustained imagery). Before discussing these empirical
findings and their theoretical implications, it is essential to first
describe each kind of conscious content. Thus, first, we describe
the nature of, and recent research on, action-related contents;
thereafter, we discuss the nature of sustained imagery. These phe-
nomena are of interest to many subfields of psychology and neu-
roscience, including attention, self-regulation, mental imagery,
mind wandering (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Mason et al.,
2007), and psychopathology (e.g., rumination, Nolen-Hoeksema
et al., 2008).
INTERNAL, ACTION-RELATED CONTENTS
Some theorists (e.g., James, 1890; Freud, 1938; Miller, 1959;
Vygotsky, 1962; Wegner, 1989) have proposed that action-related
contents, though internally-generated, are more predictable and
more tied to external control than what might appear to be
the case at first glance (see review in Allen et al., 2013). It has
been proposed that action-related contents often arise in this pre-
dictable and unintentional manner because of the “encapsulated”
nature of the generation of conscious content (Fodor, 1983; Krisst
et al., in press). Such encapsulation is evident in certain stim-
ulus environments. For example, when one holds one’s breath
while underwater, or when one runs barefoot across the hot desert
sand in order to reach water, one cannot avoid the conscious
inclinations to inhale or to avoid touching the hot ground, respec-
tively (Morsella, 2005). The action-related contents triggered by
these stimulus environments cannot be weakened or eliminated
voluntarily, even when doing so would be adaptive (Öhman
and Mineka, 2001; Morsella, 2005). These action-related urges
are both externally-triggered and encapsulated from voluntary
control. Thus, although inclinations triggered by external stim-
uli can be behaviorally suppressible, they often are not mentally
suppressible (Bargh and Morsella, 2008).
In line with these conclusions, Helmholtz (1856/1925) con-
cludes that conscious contents can arise from “unconscious infer-
ences” in a manner that resembles the classic, stimulus-response
reflex arc. One is conscious of the product (i.e., the conscious
content) of these sophisticated and unintentional processes, but
not of the processes themselves (Lashley, 1956; Miller, 1962).
Helmholtz (1856/1925) notes that such unconscious inferences
arise, not only during the generation of basic urges (e.g., for inhal-
ing), but during the generation of action-related processes that
are higher-level, as in the case of automatic word reading.
Word reading, though automatic and often effortless, is an
unnatural, intellectual process that requires years of extensive
training (Helmholtz, 1856/1925). Helmholtz makes the inter-
esting observation that, when an orthographic stimulus (e.g.,
HOUSE) is presented visually to a subject, the stimulus automati-
cally triggers a conscious representation of the phonological form
of the word (i.e., /haus/). Under these quotidian circumstances,
the visual stimulus triggers a conscious content that is very dif-
ferent in nature from that of the environmental stimulation that
brought the content into existence: The conscious representation
is associated, not with vision, but with audition (Levelt, 1989). For
object naming, perceptual and conceptual-semantic processing of
a stimulus (e.g., the picture of a house) must precede the activa-
tion of the phonological form (e.g., /haus/) of the object name
(Levelt, 1989). The conscious, phonological form of a word (e.g.,
/haus/) can be construed as action-related because it is consid-
ered a “sub-vocalized” version of the word (Vygotsky, 1962) and
because the nature of the representation is isomorphic to what
would be experienced auditorily if the word were uttered aloud
(Levelt, 1989).
THE REFLEXIVE IMAGERY TASK AND IRONIC PROCESSING
Building on these ideas and on the experimental approaches of
Ach (1905/1951), Wegner (1989), and Gollwitzer (1999), Allen
et al. (2013) developed a new paradigm, the Reflexive Imagery
Task (RIT), that allows one to begin to investigate how high-level
contents can be activated unintentionally and reliably through
external control. In the task, participants are presented with pic-
tures of objects after being instructed to not subvocalize (i.e.,
name in their minds but not aloud) the names of the objects. To
convey the nature of this effect, we will present the reader with
a demonstration of the experimental arrangement. Momentarily,
we will present you with an object enclosed within parenthe-
ses. Your task is to not subvocalize (i.e., “say in one’s head”) the
name of the object. Here is the stimulus ( ). Research demon-
strates that the combination of these instructions (which induce
a certain action set) and the presentation of the external stimulus
renders people incapable of suppressing the internally-generated
conscious content of the phonological form of the word “sun”
(Allen et al., 2013). Did you experience the effect? If so, did it
feel as if the word “sun” just popped into consciousness? If it did,
then you have experienced what many participants experience
during the RIT. When explaining their experience, participants
often simply re-describe the effect, “why, of course, if you tell me
to not think of the object name, I will.”
Empirical evidence and theorizing suggest that the effect “just
happens” to experimental participants and that the effect is not
the result of a high-level strategic process on the part of the partic-
ipant. For example, it appears that the effect does not result from
participants consciously thinking in the following manner. “I was
instructed to not think of the name of the object. The object is X.
Therefore, I should not think of X.”
Instead, entry into consciousness of the involuntary subvocal-
ization appears to be experienced as immediate and as resulting
spontaneously and automatically (Bhangal et al., 2014). This is
consistent with theorizing about the nature of this effect.Wegner’s
(1994) influential model proposes that the unintentional effect
arises from the interplay between two distinct mechanisms.
One mechanism is an intentional operating process that actively
searches for mental contents (e.g., sensations and thoughts) capa-
ble of maintaining a desired mental state. This process tends to
be effortful, capacity limited, and consciously mediated (Wegner,
1994). The other mechanism is an “ironic” monitoring process
that automatically scans activated mental contents to detect con-
tents signaling the failure to establish the desired mental state.
When the monitor detects contents that signify failed control of
the operating mechanism, it increases the likelihood that that
particular content will enter consciousness, so that the oper-
ating mechanism can then process the content and change its
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operations accordingly. Importantly for present purposes, the
ironic monitor mechanism is usually unconscious, autonomous,
and requires little mental effort. In most cases of cognitive con-
trol, the two mechanisms work together harmoniously. However,
harmony fails when the goal in mental control is to not acti-
vate a particular mental content (e.g., content X), because (a)
the operating process can bring only goal-related contents into
consciousness and cannot actively exclude contents, and (b) the
ironic monitor will reflexively bring into consciousness mental
contents (e.g., content X) incongruent with the goal at hand.
Together, the interaction of the two mechanisms will lead to the
automatic activation of content X in consciousness. (For treat-
ment of the neural correlates of the two mechanisms, see Wyland
et al., 2003; Mitchell et al., 2007. For a review of ironic process-
ing in populations suffering from various psychopathologies, see
Magee et al., 2012. For reviews of ironic processing and thought
suppression, see Wegner, 1989; Rassin, 2005.)
Despite all the research devoted to ironic processes, the
phenomenon of entry of unintentional contents into the con-
scious field during the RIT is not fully understood (Wegner and
Schneider, 2003). The entry event appears to be multifaceted,
relying on several component processes (Allen et al., 2013). For
example, as outlined in Allen et al. (2013), in order for the exper-
imental effect to arise, there is first the induction of set (e.g., to not
subvocalize the name of visual objects). Second, this set must be
sustained in workingmemory during the span between the begin-
ning of the trial and the onset of the visual object. During this
delay, the action set is thus held in mind, influencing behavioral
disposition, but not always influencing consciousness itself. The
instructions could therefore be construed as an instance of image-
less thought (cf., Woodworth, 1915). (Imageless thought was first
investigated by theorists of the Würzburg School of Psychology,
Schultz and Schultz, 1996.) Last in the process is the presentation
of the triggering stimulus (the visual object), which leads to the
entry into consciousness of imagery (e.g., subvocalization of the
object name). (It is important to note that this punctate, mental
event possesses both basic, phenomenal consciousness, because it is
a conscious experience, and also access consciousness, for the con-
scious content is mentally available for reasoning, rationality, and
action; cf., Block, 1995, 2011.)
As an experimental task, the RIT has several positive features.
First, the RIT effect is a reliable and easily replicable effect; it
occurs in the majority of subjects and in the majority of the
experimental trials. For example, in Allen et al. (2013), the effect
arose in 86% of the trials (in that study, stimuli were presented
for 4 s). Second, the effect is activated unintentionally, via exter-
nal control, thereby resembling in some ways the nature of reflex
action. That the experimental effect is unintentional diminishes
the likelihood of experimental artifacts stemming from strate-
gic processing, demand characteristics, or social desirability. (See
Allen et al., 2013, p. 1320, for a list of other features that ren-
der the RIT a fruitful paradigm for the study of consciousness).
Regarding the validity of the measure, evidence from various
sources, including neuroimaging and behavioral studies, corrob-
orate that, in paradigms in which participants must report about
the experience of a conscious content, it is unlikely that partic-
ipants confabulate about the occurrence of these mental events
(Wyland et al., 2003; Mason et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2007;
McVay and Kane, 2010). Third, the conscious content associated
with the initial version of the RIT (i.e., the phonological form)
is well-studied and has well examined properties (Miller, 1996).
Interestingly, the conscious content elicited in the RIT is “high-
level” because, in terms of stages of processing, the phonological
form is post-perceptual and requires complicated transforma-
tions, as in the case of object naming, a multi-stage process (Allen
et al., 2013).
Fourth, the paradigm also affords one the opportunity to mea-
sure, on a trial-by-trial basis, the latency and neural aspects (e.g.,
as in neuroimaging) of the response processes involved. Fifth,
the paradigm is also advantageous in that both stimulus parame-
ters (e.g., word frequency, number of letters, word valence) and
instruction (or “action set”) parameters can be varied experi-
mentally. Sixth, the RIT is also beneficial to the field in that it
builds nicely on the literature: It builds incrementally on previ-
ous research (e.g., Wegner et al., 1987; Gaskell et al., 2001; Smári,
2001), and its effects are predicted by several frameworks (e.g.,
Miller, 1959; Wegner, 1989; Gollwitzer, 1999; Morsella, 2005).
This is the kind of incremental research, involving a robust, mul-
tifaceted, and reliable phenomenon that has been investigated for
years, that is important for progress in the fields of psychological
science and neuroscience (Nosek et al., 2012). Last, the RIT pro-
vides a way of examining the mechanisms underlying entry into
consciousness, one of the greatest enigmas in science (Crick and
Koch, 2003).
As fleshed out below, the primary aim of the present project is
to investigate whether the robust and reliable effect of the RIT can
arise even when participants intentionally generate a competing
(internally-generated) conscious content: sustained imagery. One
prediction would be that such competing content would eradi-
cate the RIT effect. If the effect survives such strong interference,
the finding would suggest that the RIT effect is even stronger than
previous research suggests and that both intentional and uninten-
tional contents can co-exist in consciousness in interesting ways.
The intentional, sustained imagery carried out by participants is
another form of internally-generated conscious state and our next
topic of discussion.
SUSTAINED IMAGERY
Conscious content, such as sustained imagery, can be held in
mind through voluntary mechanisms, such as “top-down” atten-
tional control (Gazzaley and D’Esposito, 2007). In general, exec-
utive processes associated with frontal cortex function can sus-
tain the activation of representations in posterior brain regions,
regions that have been historically associated with perceptual pro-
cessing (Enger and Hirsch, 2005; Gazzaley et al., 2005). In this
way, during an executive function such as that of “refreshing,”
a recently activated representation is reactivated in mind, inde-
pendently of external, environmental stimulation. Specifically,
the process of refreshing entails “the act of thinking of, or fore-
grounding, a representation of a thought or percept which was
activated just a moment earlier and has not yet become inac-
tive” (Johnson and Johnson, 2009, p. 174). Everyday experience
and experimental evidence supports the notion that sustaining a
representation in mind, voluntarily and for a prolonged span of
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time, is an effortful process (Farah, 2000). Such a process is often
accompanied by subjective effort (Robinson and Morsella, 2014).
It is interesting to consider that, during a mental act such as
sustaining one representation in mind for a prolonged time, the
conscious field is, in a sense, “monopolized” to some extent by
that representation. The activation of other conscious contents,
if capable of arising simultaneously, must occupy the field along
with this content, which is a content that is brought into exis-
tence, not by external stimulation or stochastic processes, but by
intentional, top-down control. During such feats of intentional,
sustained imagery, one may experience, not only the desired con-
tent (activated through top-down control), but also spontaneous,
task-irrelevant cognitions. In one experiment (Morsella et al.,
2010), participants were instructed to perform a concentration
exercise in which they had to focus on their breathing for several
minutes. During the task, participants experienced and reported
task-irrelevant cognitions, including those about a future task
that would benefit from forethought. These data exemplify how,
when one focuses on the nature of only one conscious content,
other, spontaneous contents can still come to mind. These task-
irrelevant cognitions can be internally-generated in the sense that
they seem unrelated to, and not caused by, stimuli in the exter-
nal environment. These findings are relevant to research in the
fields of “mind wandering” (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006) and
rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).
THE CURRENT PROJECT
We have reviewed in brief the nature of action-related con-
tents, the RIT, and sustained imagery. The goal of the present
experimental project was to further illuminate these phenom-
ena by using the RIT to begin to examine the interactions of
internal states in the conscious field. More concretely, our goal
was to investigate whether the robust RIT effect could persist
even when participants intentionally generate competing con-
scious contents (i.e., sustained imagery). As mentioned above,
one hypothesis would be that such competing content would
eradicate the RIT effect. If the effect survives such strong inter-
ference, then it would indicate a potential coupling of two kinds
of internally-generated states: stimulus-triggered contents and
(internally-generated) sustained imagery.
In the present variant of the RIT, participants were instructed
to not subvocalize the name of visual objects, such as in the ini-
tial version of the task. Each object was presented momentarily
(10 s) on a computer screen. Participants indicated by button
press each time that they involuntarily subvocalized the object
name. As reviewed above, it is difficult for participants to sup-
press such subvocalizations. In one condition, participants were
instructed to reiteratively subvocalize a speech sound (e.g., “da,
da, da”) throughout the 10-s trial. This internally generated
content was self-generated and intentional. One might hypothe-
size that subvocalizations could still arise because of the pauses
between intended speech sounds; hence, we also investigated
whether comparable results arise even when participants subvo-
calize a continuous, unbroken hum (e.g., “daaa. . . ”) throughout
the entirety of the trial. When designing the continuous condition
and selecting the intentional imagery, we considered having the
sustained imagery be, not a syllable, but an entire word. However,
using an entire word introduced too many logistical challenges,
including that of ensuring that the intentional imagery of the
word (a discrete entity) occur at precisely the same time as the
unintentional, stimulus-triggered imagery.
INTER-CONTENT INTERACTIONS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
SUCCESSFUL SUPPRESSION OF INVOLUNTARY SUBVOCALIZATIONS
This variant of the RIT permits one to begin to examine the
nature of inter-content interactions. For example, is it the case
that, in the continuous hum condition, the hum and object name
could co-exist simultaneously in consciousness? If so, this could
reflect that, because of encapsulation, the generation of con-
scious contents cannot be suppressed (Bargh andMorsella, 2008).
Such an intriguing datumwould require further investigation. On
the other hand, perhaps these two different kinds of internally-
generated contents cannot exist simultaneously. It is interesting
to consider which contents can, and cannot, exist together in
the conscious field. Perhaps if the generation of two different
contents relies on the same underlying process, then the two con-
tents cannot exist simultaneously (cf., James, 1890; Cutting, 1976;
Navon and Gopher, 1979). This may explain why it seems that
one cannot think of two words at the same time (Navon and
Gopher, 1979). From this standpoint, the intentional activity on
the part of the participants would eradicate the RIT effect. The
RIT provides a portal through which to begin to examine such
possibilities.
Previous experimental research suggests that, regarding
the successful suppression of the involuntary subvocalizations
elicited in a task such as the RIT, participants may be using,
not only the sustained activation of the subvocalized hum to
thwart involuntary subvocalizations, but other strategies as
well, including that of self-distraction or “negative cueing”
(Wegner et al., 1987, see evidence of successful suppression
from self-distraction in Hertel and Calcaterra, 2005). Bulevich
et al. (2006), referring to an experimental finding by Hertel and
Calcaterra (2005), conclude that “suppression instructions to
not think of an unwanted response may succeed if subjects are
given the strategy (or themselves hit upon the strategy) of always
thinking of some other item when they are trying to suppress
an unwanted response” (p. 1575). Voluntarily holding in mind
auditory imagery may indeed prevent, or, at least, delay entry
of involuntary subvocalizations. In line with this view, in the
original RIT study (Allen et al., 2013), participants’ responses to
the funneled debriefing questions revealed that 8 out of 32 par-
ticipants attempted to suppress the involuntary subvocalizations
by thinking about something else (e.g., subvocalizing a melody)
or by subvocalizing about other objects.
Examining whether one conscious content (e.g., an inten-
tional, subvocalized hum) can influence the entry of other con-
tents (e.g., involuntary subvocalizations in the RIT) could yield
findings that have implications for the current understanding of,
not only cognitive control, consciousness, and mental imagery,
but of the basic mechanisms at play during psychopathological
processing (e.g., in obsessions, ruminations, intrusive cognitions,
compulsions, Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Magee et al., 2012).
Again, our aimwas to investigate whether the RIT can be thwarted
through competing, sustained imagery. If not, the finding would
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reveal that both intentional and unintentional contents can co-
exist in consciousness in interesting ways.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
San Francisco State University students (n = 84; 66 females;
MAge = 24.2 years, SE = 0.83) participated for course credit.
The involvement of human participants in our project was
approved by the Institutional Review Board at San Francisco
State University.
STIMULI AND APPARATUS
Stimuli were presented on an Apple iMac computer moni-
tor (50.8 cm) with a viewing distance of approximately 48 cm.
Stimulus presentation and data recording were controlled by
PsyScope software (Cohen et al., 1993). Participants used a com-
puter keyboard to indicate their responses to questions and
instructions. All questions and instructions were written in black
36-point Chicago font; all fonts and images were displayed on a
white background. Participants were presented with a series of
60 well-known objects (Supplementary Material) displayed in the
center of the screen, with a subtended visual angle of 6.56◦× 5.96◦
(5.5 × 5 cm). The visual objects were selected on the basis of their
high name agreement; these objects were used successfully in pre-
vious research (Snodgrass and Vanderwart, 1980; Morsella and
Miozzo, 2002; Allen et al., 2013).
PROCEDURES
In a within-subjects design, each participant experienced each of
the three conditions (Baseline [the standard RIT], Continuous
Hum, and Punctate Hum). When we initially designed the
study, we considered that participants would find it overly
challenging to carry out either of the hum conditions (which
involve dual-tasking) without first being familiarized with the
nature of the RIT. Thus, we initially designed the study so that
participants would experience the Baseline condition before
experiencing the more multifaceted, subvocalized hum condi-
tions: Following the Baseline condition, half of the participants
would experience the Continuous Hum condition, and the other
half would experience the Punctate Hum condition. However,
for the sake of thoroughness and to diminish any potential order
effects from having the Baseline condition presented first, we
had half of the participants perform the Baseline condition last.
As explained below, the same pattern of results was obtained
regardless of whether the Baseline condition was presented first
or last. The blocks of trials involving subvocalized humming
were always contiguous: Half of the participants first completed
the Continuous Hum condition, in which participants were
instructed to not think of the name of the object presented while
they maintained subvocalization of the hum (e.g., “daaa. . . ”)
for the duration of each trial. The other half of the participants
first completed the Punctate Hum condition, in which they were
instructed to do the same task, but using an intermittent form of
hum (e.g., “da, da, da”).
For all three conditions, instructions were presented on the
computer screen, which informed participants that they would
be shown a series of objects. Participants were shown each
object only once. The objects comprising each list were pre-
sented in random order. Presentation order of the three stimulus
lists (Supplementary Material) was fully counterbalanced across
participants. Upon presentation of the visual object, participants
were instructed to press the spacebar as soon as (a) they thought
of the name of the object and (b) whenever, thereafter, they
thought of the name of object during the rest of the 10 s trial. If
participants did not happen to think of the name of the object that
was presented, they were instructed to not respond in any way. It
was emphasized to participants to press the space bar as quickly
as possible as soon as they happened to think of the name of the
object. Participants were instructed to keep their eyes focused on
the center of the screen at all times during each trial.
Specifically, before each object presentation, the phrase “Do
Not Think of the Name of the Object” was displayed in the
center of the screen, serving as a ready prompt; participants
indicated their readiness by pressing the space bar (Figure 1).
For the two humming conditions, a “Begin Rehearsing” prompt
appeared on the screen (1,500ms) following the presentation of
“Do Not Think of the Name of the Object.” This prompt allowed
participants to initiate the mental rehearsal of the hum before
the trial commenced. Once participants indicated their readi-
ness, a fixation-cross (+) appeared in the center of the screen
(700ms), preparing participants for the presentation of the stim-
ulus. Following the fixation, an object appeared for 10 s, during
which time participants could indicate, by pressing the space bar,
if they happened to think of the name of the object, and for each
time that object-naming occurred for the duration of each trial.
Prior to beginning the humming conditions, participants were
informed that mental rehearsing is an act of holding something in
mind, such as holding in mind something that one has to remem-
ber. For example, if one has to remember a phone number while
looking for a pen, one often rehearses the phone number men-
tally until one can write it down. Participants were told that this
is called mental rehearsal. Participants were instructed that they
would perform a form of mental rehearsal during each trial of the
humming conditions. Upon receiving the instructions to perform
mental rehearsal, participants were informed about the distinc-
tion between continuous and punctate subvocalized humming.
Participants practiced how to carry out subvocalized humming
for each condition by imitating the instructor, who spoke the hum
aloud (e.g., “da, da, da,” for the Punctate Hum condition and
“daaa. . .” for the Continuous Hum condition). Participants were
then asked to repeat the hum, but silently (subvocalized).
Following this training, in the Continuous Hum condition
(trials = 20), participants were instructed to mentally sustain a
steady, uninterrupted form of hum throughout the duration of
each trial. For the Punctate Hum condition (trials = 20), partic-
ipants were instructed to mentally repeat a discrete, intermittent,
or “piece-by-piece” form of hum throughout the duration of each
trial. For all three conditions, participants first completed a prac-
tice trial to familiarize themselves with the task and to assure the
experimenter that they were following the instructions. At the
end of the practice trial, participants were verbally asked whether
they had any questions regarding the task. The stimuli used
during the practice trials were held constant across participants
and were distinct from the stimuli used during the experimental
trials.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic depiction of a typical trial. Not drawn to scale.
For both humming conditions, participants were reminded
to start mentally rehearsing with a prompt “Begin Rehearsing”
before they were presented with an object. We took the time to
collect some additional data. Following each of the humming tri-
als, participants were asked: “How well were you able to maintain
rehearsing throughout the duration of the trial?” Participants indi-
cated their response to the question using a one-to-eight continu-
ous scale, with 1 signifying “not well at all” and 8 signifying “very
well.” Throughout the experimental session, the experimenter
verified that participants were following instructions.
At the conclusion of the experiment, participants responded
to a series of funneled debriefing questions (following the pro-
cedures of Bargh and Chartrand, 2000), which included general
questions to assess whether (a) participants were aware of the
purpose of the study, (b) participants had any strategies for com-
pleting the task, (c) anything interfered with performance on the
task, and (d) participants felt that they tried, or intended, to fol-
low instructions. We also asked participants whether or not they
had a strategy when attempting to not think of the name of the
object. Because the study included participants who were non-
native speakers of English, we also included a series of questions
to assess whether (e) participants thought of the name of the
object in a language other than English, (f) participants pressed
the space bar in such a situation, and (g) participants had a strat-
egy for completing the task if they happened to think of the name
of the object in more than one language. Importantly, partici-
pants were also asked questions regarding their ability to carry out
the mental rehearsal, to assess whether (h) participants were able
to maintain mental rehearsal for each kind of subvocalized hum-
ming, and (i) one form of rehearsal was more effective than the
other when trying to not think of the name of the visual object.
From 84 participants, data from 76 participants were included
in the analysis. The data for 8 participants were excluded from
analyses because (a) participants did not follow instructions (e.g.,
looking away from the screen when stimuli were presented) or
(b) equipment malfunction (e.g., unexpected shut-down of the
computer software).
RESULTS
PRIMARY DEPENDENT MEASURE: PROPORTION OF TRIALS WITH
UNINTENTIONAL SUBVOCALIZATIONS
Importantly, the RIT effect survived the strong, sustained imagery
manipulation: As was found in previous experiments using the
RIT, unintentional subvocalizations occurred (at least once) on
a substantial proportion of the 20 trials comprising each of the
three conditions (MBaseline = 0.87, SE = 0.02;MContinuous Hum =
0.83, SE = 0.03; MPunctate Hum = 0.83, SE = 0.03). For each of
the three conditions, the mean rate was significantly different
from zero, ts> 26.38, ps< 0.0001.
An ANOVA with the three levels of Baseline, Continuous
Hum, and Punctate Hum yielded a main effect of condition,
F(2, 150) = 3.66, p = 0.028, η2p = 0.05. However, the same anal-
ysis with arcsine transformations of the proportion data revealed
that the effect of condition is actually non-significant, F(2, 150) =
2.05, p = 0.133, η2p = 0.03. (Arcsine transformations are often
used to statistically normalize data that are in the form of pro-
portions.) We can conclude that, for all conditions, involuntary
subvocalizing occurred frequently and at comparable rates, on
over 80% of the trials. That these involuntary subvocalizations
occurred even during the Continuous Hum condition suggests
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that the sustained imagery and involuntary subvocalizations co-
existed in the conscious field.
As mentioned above, the Baseline condition was counterbal-
anced across participants such that, for our final sample of 76
participants, it appeared as the first and last block an equal num-
ber of times (i.e., 38 times). Nevertheless, we examined whether
order of presentation of this block of trials influenced our primary
dependent measure. In a mixed ANOVA with Baseline Order as
a between-subjects factor and Condition (Baseline, Continuous
Hum, and Punctate Hum) as a within-subjects factor, there was
nomain effect of Baseline Order, F(1, 74) = 0.01, p = 0.91, a main
effect of condition, F(2, 148) = 3.67, p = 0.028, and no interaction
between the two factors, F(2, 148) = 1.14, p = 0.322. This addi-
tional analysis provides further evidence that our primary effect
of condition was not an artifact of order of presentation of the
Baseline condition. Similar null effects (Fs < 1, ps > 0.60) of
Baseline order are found in an ANOVA with arcsine transforma-
tions of the proportions, except that, in this case, the effect of
condition was non-significant, F(2, 148) = 2.03, p = 0.135.
SUBVOCALIZATIONS PER TRIAL
One of our secondary dependent measures was the number of
instances of unintentional subvocalizing per trial. This dependent
measure was comparable across the three conditions, with the
per-condition means spanning from 1.53 to 1.88 (range = 0.35;
Table 1). Importantly, for each of the three conditions, the mean
number of instances was significantly different from zero, ts >
13.43, ps< 0.0001.
An ANOVA with three levels (Baseline, Continuous Hum, and
Punctate Hum) revealed a significant main effect of condition on
this measure, F(2, 150) = 9.43, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.11 (Figure 2).
Planned contrasts revealed the Baseline condition was signifi-
cantly different from either of the humming conditions, ts> 2.80,
ps< 0.01. This pattern of results provides corroboratory evidence
that participants were in fact performing the sustained imagery.
However, the two humming conditions led to comparable effects,
t(75) = 1.70, p = 0.094.
We examined whether order of presentation of Baseline block
of trials influenced ourmeasure. In amixed ANOVAwith Baseline
Order as a between-subjects factor and Condition (Baseline,
Table 1 | Mean number of occurrences of unintentional
subvocalizations per trial and mean latencies (ms) of first
subvocalization as a function of condition.
BASELINE
Mean number 1.88 (SD = 1.22, SE = 0.14, range = 0.05–6.15)
Latency 2323.91 (SD = 1183.01, SE = 135.70)
PUNCTATE SUBVOCALIZED HUMMING
Mean number 1.64 (SD = 0.98, SE = 0.11, range = 0–5.45)
Latency 2501.00 (SD = 1050.41, SE = 122.11)
CONTINUOUS SUBVOCALIZED HUMMING
Mean number 1.53 (SD = 0.77, SE = 0.09, range = 0.05–3.65)
Latency 2415.92 (SD = 997.34, SE = 114.40)
The duration of each trial was 10 s.
Continuous Hum, and Punctate Hum) as a within-subjects fac-
tor, there was no main effect of Baseline Order, F(1, 74) = 1.65,
p = 0.204, η2p = 0.02, a main effect of condition, F(2, 148) = 9.38,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.11, and no interaction between the two factors,
F(2, 148) = 0.64, p = 0.528, η2p = 0.01. This additional analysis
provides further evidence that our effect of condition was not an
artifact of the order of presentation of the Baseline condition.
LATENCY
We examined the mean latency of the first experienced subvocal-
ization following the beginning of a trial (Table 1). An ANOVA
revealed that condition had a main effect on this measure,
F(2, 146) = 4.40, p = 0.014, η2p = 0.06. However, this main effect
was driven only by the difference between Baseline and Punctate,
t(73) = 2.87, p = 0.005; the other contrasts were non-significant,
ts< 1.08, ps> 0.28.
TRIAL-BY-TRIAL PERCEIVED DIFFICULTY OF SUBVOCALIZED HUMMING
The self-report ratings (1–8 scale) regarding the difficulty of
maintaining the intentional imagery throughout the trial (i.e., in
response to the question, “How well were you able to maintain
rehearsing throughout the duration of the trial?”) revealed that, as
one would expect (and consistent with Robinson and Morsella,
2014), it was easier for participants to sustain, throughout the
trial, the punctate imagery (M = 5.86, SE = 0.16) than the con-
tinuous imagery (M = 5.65, SE = 0.16), t(75) = 2.34, p = 0.022.
This difference provides further corroboration that participants
were following instructions and performing, as instructed, the
two different kinds of imagery.
DISCUSSION
In our project, we used a new experimental paradigm to inves-
tigate the nature of two internally generated states. Specifically,
we examined both externally-elicited conscious content and
internally-generated, sustained imagery. In addition, we obtained
some initial data regarding the nature of the interaction between
these two kinds of conscious contents. Below, we discuss the
implications of these new findings. Because much remains
unknown regarding these states and about this new paradigm, our
conclusions are conservative and tentative.
FIGURE 2 | Mean number of unintentional subvocalizations as a
function of condition (Baseline, Continuous Hum, Punctate Hum). Error
bars indicate 95% confidence interval.
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Our paradigm affords one the ability to examine further, not
only self-generated states, but an intriguing and reliable phe-
nomenon: ironic processing. We do not pretend to provide a
complete account of this interesting and robust phenomenon
(cf., Wegner and Schneider, 2003). Our findings replicate and
extend previous findings regarding ironic processing (see reviews
of findings in Wegner, 1989; Rassin, 2005). The present research
is incremental, robust, and involves a multifaceted phenomenon
that, we believe, could illuminate much about the unconscious
processes operating over supraliminal stimuli (cf., Bargh and
Morsella, 2008). As mentioned above—and as may have been
experienced by the reader in our “sun” demonstration above—
the entry into consciousness of the unintentional subvocalization
appears to be immediate and not due to high-level, strategic
processing. Consistent with this conclusion, on some trials, the
latencies of the unintentional subvocalization appeared too short
to reflect strategic processing. In addition, such strategic process-
ing would have been difficult for our participants to carry out
during the interference conditions. The notion that the RIT effect
is not caused by experimental demand or high-level strategic pro-
cesses is also consistent with the extant process model of the
phenomenon (Wegner, 1994), in which activation of the unde-
sired content in consciousness is the automatic aspect of ironic
processing. It is also consistent with the recent observation that
the subvocalizations are influenced systematically by factors such
as word frequency (Bhangal et al., 2014). The latter finding is
unlikely to result from experimental demand or strategic process-
ing. For example, regarding the former, such an artifact would
require for participants to have a theory regarding how word
frequency should influence responses in an experiment.
Our RIT effect arose despite our interference manipulations,
which, in one case, included a continuous and unbroken subvo-
calized hum (Figure 3). Moreover, the unintentional effect was
observed on roughly the same percentage of trials (over 80%)
as had been observed in experiments lacking any interference
(e.g., Allen et al., 2013). The same conclusion can be drawn
from the analysis of the rates of unintentional subvocalizations
across trials or from the analysis of the mean number of unin-
tentional subvocalizations per trial: the RIT effect was robust
and, for both dependent measures and across the three condi-
tions, the effect was always significantly different from zero. The
latency of the first unintentional subvocalization tended to be
shorter for the Baseline condition than for the Punctate condi-
tion. This observation corroborates what participants explicitly
reported to the experimenter. Moreover, the difference found in
the trial-by-trial ratings regarding the difficulty of sustaining the
imagery (in which participants reported that it was easier to sus-
tain the punctate imagery than the continuous imagery) provides
further corroboration that participants were following instruc-
tions and instantiating, as instructed, the two different kinds
of imagery. Perhaps our interference manipulation would have
thwarted the RIT effect if another kind of imagery (e.g., complete
words) had been sustained in working memory. As mentioned
above, there are logistical challenges encountered when attempt-
ing to use whole words as the form of sustained imagery in trials
spanning several seconds.
Nevertheless, in an investigation of the occurrence of
internally-generated, conscious thoughts, one cannot avoid the
technique of self-report, which brings with it well-known lim-
itations. For example, self-reports can be inaccurate, as when
memory of fleeting mental contents leads to incorrect self-reports
(Block, 2007). In addition, participants may base their responses
on heuristics or strategies regarding how one should comport
oneself in an experiment (see Discussion in Morsella et al., 2009).
Given the striking robustness and reliability of the RIT phe-
nomenon (as perhaps experienced by the reader in response
to our demonstration above), we do not believe that these
well-known limitations undermine the validity of our primary
findings.
Regarding instances of successful suppression, until more data
are obtained, we remain agnostic regarding whether participants’
performance (e.g., as reflected in their latencies) is consistent with
FIGURE 3 | Schematic representation of the temporal properties
of conscious, intentional subvocalized humming (B, Continuous
Hum; C, Punctate Hum) and unintentional subvocalizations
throughout a hypothetical trial: Vertical lines indicate points in
time at which participants reported stimulus-triggered,
unintentional subvocalizations. In the Baseline condition (A),
participants were not instructed to subvocalize any form of
humming.
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“inhibition” accounts of cognitive control (cf., Aron, 2007; Levy
andWagner, 2011) or with other accounts, such as Jamesian ideo-
motor approaches in which successful suppression is interpreted
as resulting, not from direct inhibition of the undesired action
plan, but from the sustained activation of an incompatible action
plan (see Hommel, 2009).
Our finding that the stimulus-triggered subvocalization arose
despite participants’ intentions, and despite the fact that the con-
scious field was occupied by other contents (e.g., the sustained
imagery), is consistent with theorizing about the encapsulated
nature of the generation of conscious contents (Fodor, 1983;
Krisst et al., in press). From the standpoint of Krisst et al.
(in press), this encapsulation is built into the system because
it would be maladaptive for the generation of conscious con-
tents to be controlled completely by one’s beliefs or desires
(see also Pylyshyn, 1984; Firestone and Scholl, 2014). From
this standpoint, and consistent with the notion of the uncon-
scious inference (Helmholtz, 1856/1925), the RIT effect reflects
the nature in which most conscious contents are (and should
be) generated—automatically and independently of one’s voli-
tion. Contents reflecting intentional, top-down processing are a
small subset of all conscious contents. Our finding is also con-
sistent with approaches that regard conscious contents as “action
options” that, though activated in the conscious field, need not
influence action directly (Allen et al., 2013). (Investigators have
begun to examine the behavioral consequences of such unselected
action options, Filevich andHaggard, 2013.) Together, these views
concerning “action options” and about the encapsulated nature of
content generation may have implications for our understanding
of the basic mechanisms in psychopathological phenomena (e.g.,
in obsessions, ruminations, intrusive cognitions, compulsions,
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Magee et al., 2012).
Building on Filevich and Haggard (2013), future investigations
could focus on the behavioral consequences of the unintentional
subvocalizations triggered by the RIT. In addition, research could
examine whether participants perceive the sustained imagery
as associated with “the self” and perceive the unintentional
imagery as “foreign to the self” (cf., Riddle and Morsella, 2009;
Montemayor et al., 2013). It is our hope that future studies will
build on this paradigm and on our findings, thereby yielding
more insights about these elusive, self-generated states.
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